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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, a challenge against the articles of the Criminal Code was 
filed before the Colombian Constitutional Court –hereinafter “the 
Court”– for the second time in the eighteen years of the Court’s 
short history The challenged provisions of the Criminal Code 
established abortion as a crime punishable without exception. The 
decision issued by the Court was considered as “historic” landmark 
in which the Court decided not to consider abortion as crime in three 
specific circumstances: (i) when the continuation of the pregnancy 
presents risks to the life or the health of the woman, as certified 
by a medical doctor; (ii) when there are serious malformations of 
the fetus incompatible with life outside the womb, as certified by a 
medical doctor; and (iii) when the pregnancy is the result of any of 
the following criminal acts, duly reported to the proper authorities: 
incest, rape, sexual abuse, or artificial insemination or implantation 
of a fertilized ovule without the woman’s consent1. 
The Court’s decision was six hundred pages long, which includes 
one hundred and forty five pages –together with dissenting opinion– 
referring to abortion in a comparative law perspective and trying to 
analyze how other legal systems dealt how to regulate and permit 
abortion in the first trimester under precise circumstances. 
From a comparative law perspective, the Court decision and it 
references to foreign solutions, bring into discussion the fiction of 
1 Colombian Constitutional Court, Decision C – 355/06
Comparative Law approach to the abortion Decision 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court
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the “Failed law” of Latin America described by Jorge Esquirol2. 
The fiction of “Failed law” is pervasive in Latin America because 
legislators, seeking to change domestic laws are inevitably looking 
to foreign legal systems, as a consequence of the incapacity of Latin 
American judges and legislatures to justify legal change by ideas 
rooted in their domestic legal regime. Therefore, legal borrowing 
and implementing legal reform models adopted by both foreign 
legislatures and courts seem to be a more promising solution to 
problematic gap between law and society in Latin America.
This gap consists in the traditional exaggeration that since their 
independence, many Latin American countries have adopted a 
very formal legal regime3 in which thousands of legislations are 
adopted frequently and they remain in the books rather than being 
applied in practice. The frequent transformation of such laws in the 
books has traditionally looked towards Europe, in order to borrow 
new legal ideas. Nevertheless, those legal changes do not create 
the necessary solutions society needs, because even when Latin 
America society has stated in each country Constitution –and wants 
to follow– the same moral values as the European society, societies 
of Latin America have become different to the European ones; being 
impossible to pretend look towards Europe arguing Latin America 
possess the same law and moral values as in Europe4. Behind this 
exaggeration and frequent transformations is the “Failed law” thesis 
as justification.    
Despite the importance of the “Failed law” thesis, which offers one 
explanation of why Latin American, and in particular, legislatures 
are obsessed by comparisons, I want to accept in part and partially 
depart from such thesis. I accept the existence of the gap between 
law and society –not as an exaggeration5– and the necessity to look 
2 Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America. 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 75 (2008)
3 Héctor Fix-Zamudio, Docencia en las facultades de derecho. 3 Boletín del Colegio 
de Abogados de México 2 (1973).
4 Jorge L. Esquirol, Fictions of Latin American Law. 1997 Utah L. Rev. 446.
5 Is not an exaggeration in the sense that the very formal regime adopted by Latin 
American countries has been the most predominant  but the only one; along Latin 
American legal history in countries as Colombia, attempts have arisen to break with 
the mentioned homogeneity. See, Diego Eduardo López Medina. El Derecho de los 
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towards other countries to find the correct solutions, while I depart 
in accept the existence of Latin America “Failed Law” idea, first, 
because it is a mere fiction6 and; second, because establishes legal 
borrowing as the solution.
As what I accept is the existence of the mentioned gap and the 
subsequent necessity to look towards other countries to address 
such situation. I am also convinced judiciaries play an important 
role analyzing both law in the books and courts decisions, in order 
to block up the gap by adopting what they think fits better for society 
without rolling over it values7, which at the end is another theory of 
why the law travels that recently some authors labeled the migration 
of ideas.8 Differently from borrowings and legal transplants, the 
migration of ideas offers an additional explanation to the “Failed 
law” fiction. From a migration of ideas standpoint, the references 
made by the Court to the abortion decisions in foreign countries, 
can be understood as an attempt for strategic change. By using 
the legitimacy of legal concepts that allowed legal change around 
the world, concepts such as “privacy”, “human dignity” and the 
“protection of the unborn” can migrate and, thereby, they are used 
strategically by Colombian judges. The migration of this ideas in the 
Latin American context allows legal concepts to perform a different 
role than the one they performed in Germany, US or Ireland by 
fitting the expectation and managing the tensions around abortion 
that are peculiar to the  Colombian society. 
This paper analyzes the recent Court decision on abortion, by 
comparing it to the United States, Germany and Ireland abortion 
decisions. The point of this comparison is to show that the 
Colombian decision can be placed in a continuum from more liberal 
to more conservative decisions on the abortion scenario. After 
Jueces. 240 (Universidad de los Andes – Legis, 2004). In one the chapters of his 
book, López Medina mentioned   
6 Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America. 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 79 (2008)
7 Dennis O. Lynch, Hundred Months of Solitude: Myth or Reality in Law and 
Development? 223 Am. B. Found Res. J. 226 (1983)
8 Sujit Choudry, Migration as a new Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, 
in The Migration of Constitutional ideas 448, 1 – 36 (Cambridge University Press 
ed., 2006).
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organizing these decisions along a political spectrum where the 
Colombian decision is half way between Germany and Ireland, this 
paper focuses on three additional comparative law insights. First, I 
underline the main concepts established by the three foreign courts 
to regulate abortion and mediate with different social tensions in the 
US, Germany and Ireland. Second, I analyze two Colombian Court 
abortion decisions, the first one decided in 1994 where the Court 
held that abortion was not permitted under any circumstance. The 
second one decided in 2006, where the Court allowed abortion in 
the first trimester under specific circumstances. Finally, the paper 
analyze the second Court’s decision under both the Failed Law 
fiction and the Migration of Ideas approach in an attempt to depart 
from the exaggeration of the gap between law and society in Latin 
America and the constant need of legal borrowing by legislatures and 
answer: what significance, if any, do constitutional practices in other 
nations, or other international influences, have in the resolution of 
constitutional issues concerning abortion in Colombia?
II. (U.S. – GERMANY – IRELAND) ABORTION DECISIONS
Comparative constitutional lawyers9, analyzing abortion decisions 
around the world, have focused on the United States well known 
decisions –Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey–, in the attempt to compare them with the 
1975 and 1993 German decisions of the Federal Constitutional 
Court. Both courts in the US and Germany reach functionally 
similar outcomes in allowing a woman to chose to have an abortion 
under some limited circumstances. However the justification for 
their decisions appear diametrically opposite insofar that the United 
States Supreme Court grounds its decision on the notion of privacy 
and individual liberty, whereas the German Federal Constitutional 
Court grounds its decision on the notion of human dignity and the 
role of the welfare state in preserving the decision of each individual. 
Differently, for other constitutional law authors10, the analysis of 
9 Mark Tushnet & Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Law: Cases and 
Materials, 1557 (Foundation Press ed., 2006)
10 Norman Dorse et al., Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and Materials, 1383 
(Thomson West ed., 2003)
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abortion constitutional courts goes beyond Germany and United 
States and they address other courts decisions such as Ireland and 
Poland. In both countries the constitutional courts decisions are not 
as “liberal” in outcomes as the United States or Germany, even when 
there are resemblances in the reasoning of judges to reach different 
goals, namely the prohibition for a woman to abort under particular 
circumstances during the first semester.
My paper shows why it is important to place these Western liberal 
democracies on a spectrum along the more progressive and the 
more conservative outcome. However, my work is innovative in 
two respects: First, I show that is a structural similarity in the way 
ideas migrate from one country to another, even when they perform 
different functions. Second, I show that the Colombia decision is 
key to show that Latin America has a different position than Ireland 
or the United States on the political spectrum and that the migration 
of ideas happens in Colombia to mediate with different socio-
economic tensions than the ones in Germany, US and Ireland.
Thus, some excerpts from the United States, Germany and Ireland 
decisions –as an overall view–, will be analyze for a further 
rationalization of the abortion decision in Colombia.
A. Roe v. Wade (1973)
In this decision, the Supreme Court of the United States – hereinafter 
“the Supreme Court” – decided whether or not, the Texas statutes, 
which make it a crime to “procure an abortion” except by medical 
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother, are according 
to the Constitution.  For Jane Roe –plaintiff in the litigation–, Texas 
statute prohibition “abridged her right of personal privacy, protected 
by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments11.” 
In a first moment, The Supreme Court gives an historical background 
of the abortion through the different stages of humanity, in order to 
11 Mark Tushnet & Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Law: Cases and 
Materials, 1557, 6 (Foundation Press ed., 2006)
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conclude abortion is a medical procedure that, “in early pregnancy, 
that is, prior to the end of the first trimester, although not without 
risk, is no relatively safe12.”Consequently, “important state interests 
in the area of health and medical standards remain. The State has a 
legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical 
procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum 
safety for the patient.”
Turning the study of the case to the appellant arguments, the Supreme 
Court begins it asserting “The Constitution does not explicitly 
mention ay right of privacy… [But] the Court has recognized that 
the right of personal privacy or a guarantee of certain areas or zones 
of privacy, does exist under the Constitution13.” 
Nevertheless, “this right of privacy, whether it be founded in 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and 
restrictions upon state action… is broad enough to encompass a 
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy… the 
privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute… 
[We], therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes 
the abortion decision, but this right is not unqualified and must be 
considered against important state interest regulation14.” 
In addition, as “the woman right of privacy is no longer sole and 
any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly,15” 
basically because the State also possess an interest in the health of 
the mother, which does not happen referring to the unborn. For the 
Supreme Court – following the arguments of the plaintiff –, the 
unborn is not included under the definition of “person” provided by 
the Constitution.
Thus, the Supreme Court established a period of three months – first 
trimester – in which women can abort without legal consequences, 
“because of the now-established medical fact that until the end of 
the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in 
12  Ibid., 16
13 Ibid., 18
14 Ibid., 18 - 19
15 Ibid., 21
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normal childbirth… [If] the State is interested in protecting fetal life 
after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that 
period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of 
the mother16.”
The Supreme Court reference to a “right of privacy”, which does 
not appear in the Constitution, comes from Griswold v. Connecticut 
and other prior cases, where the Supreme Court dealt with the liberty 
of the individual and how this it, as a general constitutional phrase 
can limit the powers of legislatures. Consequently, majority of the 
individual liberties are not explicitly in the Constitution itself, but 
can be consider on it by the penumbra Constitutional Amendments 
have. Thus, Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
“… [My] conclusion that the concept of liberty is not so restricted 
and that it embraces the right of marital privacy though that right 
is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution is supported both by 
numerous decisions of this Court, referred to in the Court’s opinion, 
and by the language and history of the Ninth Amendment.17”
In that order of ideas, the Supreme Court argument of the right of 
privacy woman possess, regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, 
allows her to abort in the first three months of pregnancy.        
B. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey (1992)
In this occasion, the Supreme Court dealt with the challenge of 
unconstitutional of some requirements contained by the Pennsylvania 
Abortion Control Act, which established “a woman seeking an 
abortion give her informed consent prior to the abortion procedure, 
and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 
24 hours before the abortion is performed, For a minor to obtain an 
abortion, the informed consent of one of her parents… unless certain 
exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign 
16 Ibid., 22 - 23
17 William Cohen & Jonathan D. Varat, Constitutional Law: Cases and materials, 
567 (Foundation Press ed., 11, 2001).
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her intended statement indicating that she has notified her husband 
of her intended abortion.18”
For the Supreme Court, some problems arrived making the decision, 
more exactly, determine the exact scope of the right to liberty when 
“[Neither] the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at 
the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the 
outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects19,” which can conclude in overruling Roe v. 
Wade reasoning. 
Nevertheless, for the Supreme Court there is no influential argument 
to overrule it earlier decisions, even when decisions earlier to Roe v. 
Wade uphold what the Supreme Court held. In the own Supreme Court 
words, “Because the case before us present no such occasion it could 
be seen as no response. Because neither the factual underpinnings 
of Roe’s central holding nor our understanding of it has changed… 
the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the prior law with 
any justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out 
differently from the Court of 1973.20”
As a result, the Supreme Court did a specific change in what it 
consider not essential in Roe v. Wade, i.e. the trimester framework, 
which is “a rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at 
the protection of the fetal life. The trimester framework suffers from 
these basic flaws: in its formulation it misconceives the nature of the 
pregnant woman’s interest; and in practice it undervalues the State’s 
interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.21”Consequently, the 
Supreme Court decided to use the undue burden standard, because 
“is the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the 
woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.22”
18 Tushnet & Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Law: Cases and 
Materials, 1557, 26 (Foundation Press ed., 2006)
19 Ibid., 27
20 Ibid., 34
21 Ibid., 38
22  Ibid., 39
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According to this new standard, from all the requirements challenged 
before the Supreme Court, determine if the informant consent and 
the mandatory 24 hours waiting period constitutionality are the 
most susceptible issues. Thus, the problem arise trying to answer 
if “whether the mandatory 24 hours waiting period is nonetheless 
invalid because in practice it is a substantial obstacle to a woman’s 
choice to terminate her pregnancy23,” which for the Supreme Court, 
does not constitutes an undue burden.
C. 1975 German Abortion Decision
In year 1974, German Legislature issued new abortion regulation 
based in the periodic model, i.e. abortion before the 13th day following 
the conception is legal, freedom of punishment for the interruption 
of pregnancy performed by a physician in the first twelve weeks and, 
the interruption of pregnancy by a physician after twelve in certain 
circumstances24. This provisions –enclosed in the Penal Code–, were 
challenged by a group of legislators, having as a basis the Basic 
Law, which in one of it articles “protects the life developing itself in 
the womb of the mother as an intrinsic legal value.25”
For the Federal Constitutional Court –hereinafter “the Federal 
Court”–, the construction of the constitutional provisions signifies 
“the protection cannot be limited either to the <<completed>> human 
being after birth or to the child about to be born which is independently 
capable of living…. <<everybody>> in the sense of Article 2, 
Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law is <<everyone living>>; 
expressed in another way: every life possessing human individuality; 
<<everyone>> also includes the yet unborn human being26.” 
23 Ibid., 42
24 (i) in order to avert from the pregnant woman a danger to her life or the danger 
of a serious impairment to the condition of her health, (ii) the child will suffer from 
an impairment of its health which cannot be remedie don account of an hereditary 
disposition or injurious prenatal influences which is so serious that a continuation of 
the pregnancy cannot be reasonably expected of the pregnant woman; and not more 
than 22 weeks have elapsed since conception.
25 Ibid., 114
26 Mark Tushnet & Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Law: Cases and 
Materials, 1557, 115 (Foundation Press ed., 2006) 
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Furthermore, for the Federal Court, the notion of human dignity 
plays an important role determining the unborn status. The concept 
of human dignity and the right to life are indivisible, only where 
human life exists, human dignity is presented, acknowledging 
potential life exists in the unborn and, therefore, human dignity. 
Thus, “the interruption of pregnancy irrevocably destroys an 
existing human life. Abortion is an act of killing… [The] obligation 
of the state to protect the developing life exists – as shown – against 
the mother as well.27”However, the respect for the unborn life does 
not mean the woman must sacrifice her own life when in certain 
circumstances an emergency arise, declaring as unconstitutional the 
provision allowing abortion before the 13th day of conception.
Perhaps, is important to copy an excerpt of the Federal Court 
decision, which for comparative purposes is interesting:
“The regulation encountered in the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal 
Law at times is defended with the argument that in other democratic 
countries of the Western World in recent times penal provisions 
regulating the interruption of pregnancy has been <<liberalized>> 
or <<modernized>> in a similar or an even more extensive fashion… 
[These] considerations cannot influence the decision to be made 
here… [the] legal standards which are applicable there for the acts 
of the legislature are essentially different from those of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Underlying the Basic Law are principles for 
the structuring of the state that may be understood only in light 
of the historical experience and the spiritual-moral confrontation 
with the previous system of National Socialism… [human] beings 
possess an inherent worth as individuals in order of creation which 
uncompromisingly demands unconditional respect for the life of 
every individual human being, even for the apparently socially 
<<worthless>>, and which therefore excludes the destruction of 
such life without legally justifiable grounds.28” 
27 Ibid., 118
28  Ibid., 123. About this excerpt a comment will be done in the conclusions to this 
chapter.
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D. 1993 German Abortion Decision
After the reunification, a new law was enacted, which stated similar 
provisions to the ones of the law declared unconstitutional in 1975 
by the Federal Tribunal. Thus, practice an abortion during the first 
14 days of conception is legal and during the first twelve weeks if 
the woman goes before a counseling, who authorizes abortion. 
For the Federal Court, there is no doubt that the fetus from the 
moment of implantation possesses human dignity, which signifies 
he possesses the right to life and, therefore, the state has the duty 
to protect him. The mentioned protection “required the state to 
take steps to prevent situations from arising in which a pregnancy 
would place unreasonable demands on the woman… [which] could 
render an abortion <<justified>>. Even if abortion in the absence of 
unreasonable demands were decrimininalized, it would still be an 
unjustified and lawful action.29” So, woman will not be punish under 
permitted circumstances, even when her action is unlawful.
In addition, the counseling required by the woman during the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy –known as “unevaluated abortion”– 
resulted unconstitutional, because the counseling is not looking 
towards the protection of the unborn, which is a duty of the 
state. Hence, medical insurance system must pay only for lawful 
abortions and exceptionally when woman the woman seeking for an 
unevaluated an abortion does not have funds to pay for itself.
E. The Attorney General v. X (Ireland)
As a contrast, the Irish experience with abortion can be presented 
as different in comparison to the United States and Germany. The 
Irish Constitution, as a consequence of an amendment –known as 
the Eight Amendment– affirm “The State acknowledges the right to 
life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the 
mother, guarantees in its laws to respect and, as far as practicable, by 
its laws to defend and vindicate that right.” As a result, abortion in 
Ireland is not allowed, without exception.
29 Ibid., 131 - 132
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In year 1992, a fourteen year old woman –known during the process 
as “x”–, was sexually assaulted and made pregnant by the father of 
a friend. When the woman parents tried to travel to Great Britain for 
an abortion, the public prosecutor went before the court to get an 
order barring “x” from leaving the country. 
The Supreme Court of Ireland, knowing the case in last instance, 
dealt with two problems: (i) the travel plans posed a real and 
imminent danger to the life of the unborn and; (ii) the risk that “x” 
would commit suicide, as a consequence of her actual status.
Even when the right to travel is recognized by the European 
Community –which Ireland is a party–,” if there were a stark conflict 
between the right of a mother of an unborn child to travel and the 
right to life of the unborn child, the right to life would necessarily 
have to take precedence over the right to travel.30”
Considering the second question, secondary problems arose for it 
solution. The Eight Amendment expresses the equal right to life of 
mother and unborn; nevertheless, the Oireachtas –i.e. Irish Congress– 
must pass a law to determine the construction of the Amendment, 
necessary for the resolution of any individual case. Therefore, 
construing the mentioned provision, the Supreme Court recognized 
“the Eighth Amendment refer only to the creation or destruction of 
life... [If] clarity were needed, that the unborn life was also life within 
the guarantee of protection. It went further, and expressly spelled out 
a guarantee of protection of the life of the mother of the unborn life, 
by guaranteeing her life equality of protection, to dispel any confusion 
there might have been thought to exist to the effect that the life of the 
infant in the womb must be saved even if it meant certain death for the 
mother. The death of a fetus may be the indirect but foreseeable result 
of an operation undertaken for other reasons. Indeed it is difficult to 
see how any operation, the sole purpose of which is to save the life 
of the mother, could be regarded as a direct killing of the fetus, if the 
unavoidable and inevitable consequences of the efforts to save the 
mother’s life lead to the death of the fetus.31”
30 Attorney General v. X and Others, Supreme Court of Ireland, 1992 No. 846P
31 Ibid., 72
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“Therefore no recognition of a mother’s right of self-determination 
can be given priority over the protection of the unborn life. The 
creation of a new life, involving as it does pregnancy, birth and 
raising the child, necessarily involves some restriction of a mother’s 
freedom but the alternative is the destruction of the unborn life. The 
termination of pregnancy is not like a visit to the doctor to cure 
an illness. The State must, in principle, act in accordance with the 
mother’s duty to carry out the pregnancy and, in principle must also 
outlaw termination of pregnancy.32”
The Supreme Court, decided “x” can travel to Great Britain, based 
on her physical and mental condition, which constituted a risk 
for both mother and unborn. Therefore, when “there is a real and 
substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother 
which can only be avoided by the termination of her pregnancy, such 
termination is permissible, having regard to the true interpretation of 
Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution.33”
F. Conclusions
After a brief summary of the abortion decisions from three foreign 
courts, attempting to focus on the ratio decidendi and decisium of 
each one, is possible arrive to different conclusions, which will 
constitute the basis for the Colombian decision.
First of all –from a functionalism approach–, abortion does not have 
the same treatment in each country, thereby, the United States is the 
only which allow the woman to abort during the first three months 
without conditions. Second, abortion after a specific period –first 
trimester– is allow when there is a risk for the life of the mother or 
the unborn, in the three countries34. Third, in the three countries there 
32 Ibid., 72
33  Ibid., 53
34 Although, in Ireland those three circumstances do not exist, they can be inferred 
from the “risk for the life of the mother or the unborn” established by U.S. and 
Germany too. Thus, the three circumstances in the United States and Germany 
involve the risk for the life of the mother or the unborn, therefore, is possible to 
conclude in Ireland these three circumstances also exist. 
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is no doubt the State has an interest in protect the life of the unborn, 
however, differences arrives in the intensity of such interest. Fourth, 
Ireland is the only of the countries, where abortion is not permitted 
under any circumstance on the basis of the liberty woman possesses. 
Fifth, In the United States the abortion is a legal procedure, while in 
Ireland and Germany is illegal, even when the State allows it when 
there is a risk for the life of the mother or the unborn; therefore, 
the practice is illegal but not punishable. Sixth, only in the United 
States woman and unborn does not possesses equal rights –i.e. right 
to life–, because the unborn is not consider a person; on the contrary, 
Ireland and Germany recognized the same rights on the basis of 
human dignity35. 
In that order of ideas, the following diagram is useful to understand 
how in each country abortion is construed. The discussion in 
comparative constitutional law has always moved towards United 
States and Germany and their differences. Adding Ireland, the 
diagram will show United States and Ireland in opposite sides, while 
Germany in the middle36.
G. Reference the concept of Human Dignity
Short lines are necessary to explain in a succinct way a concept 
familiar in majority of the Civil Law countries and –to a certain 
35 Catholic while the other is historical 
36 The United States decisions has been placed in the side of the most liberalized 
around the world, while Ireland in the conservative side. Comparing these two 
countries is not possible to place Germany in one of the two sides, because some of 
the elements do not fit correctly; therefore, is not a mere whim the German position 
in the diagram.
Liberal
(Abortion is
allowed
without
requirements)
UNITED STATES
GERMANY
IRELAND
Conservative
(Abortion is
only allowed
under specific
circumstances)
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extent– incomprehensible in Common Law countries. Nonetheless, 
this idea has been detached by the materialization of Human Rights, 
which contains this concept of Human Dignity implicit. For the 
purposes of this paper, how this concept of Human Dignity and 
the role it played in the decision made by the Federal Court must 
be track down, basically because it is one of the influences on the 
Colombian decision.
The only possibility to understand in an accurate way the concept 
of Human Dignity, can only be made from a philosophical point of 
view. Metaphysics and it founders –i.e. Aristotle and later St. Thomas 
Aquinas–, can be useful to understand the concept.  Relevant passages 
from the Summa Theologiae37, shows the correct meaning for the 
concept, which refers the human being not as a mere object but an “end 
itself”. This same idea was studied by Emmanuel Kant, who found that 
means dignity has no price38. Therefore, all the persons possess human 
dignity, just for the mere fact of belong to the human specie.
After the end of the Second World War and the victory of the allies, a 
new project on the German society began with the idea of re-establish 
the values the “nazi regime” implanted during the war. Thus, German 
Basic Law enacted in year 1949 – just after the war ended – came up 
as the new model, opposed to what the Reich did during the Weimar 
Constitution. After seen all the atrocities committed by the Hitler’s 
regime, it is very understandable that a provision on the inviolability 
of human dignity heads the text of the German Basic Law.
37 8 ST 2-2.102.2: It pertains to those who are established in dignity to govern 
subjects. Now, to govern is to move some people towards a due goal, just as the 
naval pilot governs the ship, by steering it to the port. Moreover, every source of 
movement has some excellence and power over that which is moved [by it]. Hence, 
it is necessary that in the person established in [a position of] dignity, there is first 
to be considered the excellence in status with some power over subjects; secondly, 
there is to be considered the very office of government. By reason of the excellence, 
honor is his due, [honor] being a recognition of someone’s excellence. By reason 
of the governmental role submission is owing to him, which consists in a certain 
compliance whereby someone obeys their commands and repays at one’s own level 
benefits received.
38 David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein, The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse,313, 149 (Kluwer Law International, 2002)  
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Then, the constitution adopts the view that dignity of man means 
recognition of the human being as a bearer of rights as a person 
before the law39 –which includes the unborn to according to the 
Federal Court reasoning–. 
III. COLOMBIA AND THE ABORTION 
(THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS)
The Colombian experience dealing with abortion decisions is 
completely new in comparison with countries as United States and 
Germany. The first time the Colombian Constitutional Court decided 
about constitutionality of abortion was in year 1994. 
A. RULING C – 133/94 
In this time, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the 
Criminal Code provision which prohibited abortion. As arguments 
he stated (i) the unborn is not “person” according to the Civil Code 
definition, which follows the “Birth Theory” to assert a person 
exist since the moment he(she) born; (ii) thus, the State has the 
duty to protect a person, and as the unborn is not included in the 
category, there is no reason for a provision prohibiting abortion; (iii) 
Constitution guarantees the freedom of conscience, therefore, the 
Constitution allows the woman to make voluntarily an abortion, and; 
(iv) even when Constitution also guarantees freedom of religion, 
the idea of treat the unborn as person privilege the Catholic Church 
point of view, which the majority in Colombia follows but is not the 
only religion.
The Court affirmed the constitutional protection of life extended to 
the unborn, which is not stricto sensu a person, but possess the right 
to life. Consequently, the Court ruled the Congress has the power 
to decide the measures to protect human life and, when there is a 
tension between the rights of the mother and the unborn, Congress 
and not the Court is the authorize –and adequate– body to design the 
right criminal policies for these situations. 
39 Ibid., 146 
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Three justices issued a dissenting opinion, in which they agreed 
with the majority position concerning the legislature’s power to 
criminalize abortion, but strongly criticized the absolute character 
of the criminal provision under review, because the provision did 
not account for the possibility of the cases in which abortion is less 
damaging alternative for both the mother and the legal system40.
In the majority of the arguments given by these three justices, some 
of the ideas of the United States and Germany decisions can be 
found. Thus, referring to the intrinsic value of life, even when “there 
is a consensus in consider abortion as morally problematic, which 
can be justified, according to some say, it can be practice only when 
powerful reasons exist, among others save mother’s life, rape or the 
unborn has serious malformations problems. Some perspectives –as 
the one ruled by German constitutional jurisprudence– consider it 
can also be justified, too, if the burden pregnancy involves to the 
mother, limits her opportunities up to the point to prevent her of 
carrying out as human being, attended her social and economic 
circumstances. Lastly, the doctrine based on the right of privacy 
defence, established by the United States Supreme Court in Roe 
v. Wade, recognized the woman right to choose, through the first 
trimester of her pregnancy –period’s system– if she wants to carry 
the fetus or abort, without any risk for her life, going to the health 
service the State offers, with what the woman has the liberty to 
decide on this moral option.41” 
B. RULING C – 013/97
Going through an actio popularis against a provision of the Criminal 
Code, which established lower penalties for mother convicted of 
abortion when pregnancy resulted of rape or unconsentual embryo 
implantation or artificial insemination? For the plaintiff in this case, 
the mentioned provision was unconstitutional, because gives to 
human life a lower value. Again, the Court affirmed Congress as the 
40 Manuel Jose Cepeda, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The Origin, Role 
and Impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. 
Rev., 558 (2004)
41 Sentencia C – 133/94
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responsible to criminalize abortion and determined as constitutional 
such criminal provision. It must be noted that this decision expressly 
defined abortion as an action that should be “repudiated”, and quoted 
a number of Papal Encyclicals to support its line of reasoning, a 
matter expressly disapproved by the dissenting justices42.
RULING C – 355/06 
In year 2000, new justices were elected in the Constitutional Court. 
This judicial body composed by justices qualified as “experts in the 
last law theories”, made a new decision in year 2006, examining 
constitutionality of the provisions criminalizing abortion in the new 
Criminal Code enacted in year 2000. As a result, the Court decided 
the provisions are constitutional but do not constitute a crime under 
specific circumstances.   
The relevant considerations of the Court – for the purposes of this 
paper –, can be divided in five main topics as follows: (i) Life seen 
as a constitutionally relevant value that must be protected by the 
Colombian State and as distinguished from the “right to life”, (ii) The 
principle and fundamental dignity right as a limit on the legislature’s 
discretion over criminal matters, (iii) The right to free development 
of the individual as a limit to the legislature’s discretion over 
criminal matters, (iv) Health, life and bodily integrity as limits to 
the legislature’s discretion over criminal matters, and; (v) the issue 
of abortion in comparative law. Some excerpts from the Court’s 
decision concerning these five topics are important here.
(i) Life seen as a constitutional relevant value that must be 
protected by the Colombian State and as distinguished from the 
“right to life”
“…[Although] one of the Congress function is the approval of 
suitable measures to fulfill the duty to protect life, this does not mean 
that all of the measures taken with such determination are therefore 
42 Manuel Jose Cepeda, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The Origin, Role 
and Impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. 
Rev., 558 (2004)
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justified, because despite of its constitutional relevance, life does 
not have the relevance of an absolute value or right, and it must be 
weighed with all of the other constitutional values, principles and 
rights.”
“Within the constitutional norms, life receives different normative 
treatment. Therefore, is possible to make a distinction between the 
right to life established in article 11 of the Constitution, and life as a 
constitutionally protected right. The right to life supposes that there 
is an entitlement of such right in order for it to be exercised, and that 
entitlement, as in every single right, is restricted to the human being. 
On the other hand, protection of life can be predicted even from 
those who have not yet reached this condition.”
“… [According] to the points exposed, life and the right to life are 
different phenomena. Human life takes place in different stages 
and is shown in different forms, which at every given time have 
a different protection by the laws. The legal system does grant 
protection to the nasciturus, but not in the same level and intensity as 
it does to the human being. This goes to the extent that in most of the 
legislations there is a higher penalty for infanticide or for homicide 
than for abortion. The protected right is not identical in these cases 
and because of that, the legal significance of the social offense 
determines a different degree of reproach and a proportionally 
different penalty.”
(ii) The principle and fundamental dignity right as a limit on the 
legislature’s discretion over criminal matters
“Despite their different functional nature, the norms that are 
deduced from the normative statement of human dignity – the 
constitutional principle of human dignity and the fundamental right 
to human dignity – agree in what refers to the scope of protected 
behaviors. As a matter of fact, this Court has stated that in those 
cases in which human dignity is used argumentatively as a relevant 
criterion to decide, can be deduced that it protects:  (i) the autonomy 
or possibility of designing a life plan and self – determination 
according to that plan’s characteristics (living at will), (ii) certain 
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concrete material conditions of existence (living well), (iii) the 
intangibility of non patrimonial goods, physical and moral integrity 
(living without humiliations).”
“… [Thus] human dignity assures a scope of autonomy and moral 
integrity that must be respected by the State and particulars. 
Regarding women, the scope of protection of human dignity 
includes both, the decisions related to her life plan, which include 
reproductive autonomy, and the guaranty of her moral intangibility, 
which would be concretely evidenced in prohibitions to assign 
stigmatizing gender roles, or deliberately inflicts moral suffering.”
“…[In] those terms, especially regarding its first meaning – human 
dignity as the protector of a scope of individual autonomy and the 
possibility of choosing a life plan – the constitutional precedents have 
understood that it establishes a limit to the legislature’s constitutive 
power in criminal matters.” 
(iii) The right to free development of the individual as a limit to 
the legislature’s discretion over criminal matters
“As the Constitutional Court has stated, this right condenses the 
in nuce liberty, “because any type of liberty is reduced to it”. This 
right deal with the general right to act, which understands the 
specific freedom rights established in the Constitution (freedom of 
religion, of conscience, of expression, of information, of choosing 
a profession or occupation, economic freedoms, etc.), along with 
the scope of individual autonomy, which is not protected by any of 
those rights.”
“For a long time, constitutional precedents have identified a scope of 
conducts protected by the right to free development of the individual, 
among which it is important to mention the following because of 
their importance to case under analysis.”
“The right to be a mother, or in other words, the right to opt for 
motherhood as a “life choice,” is a decision of the utmost private 
nature for each woman. Therefore, the Constitution does not allow 
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the state, the family, the employer or educational institutions to 
introduce any regulation or policy infringing the right of a woman 
to choose to be a mother or that interferes with the rightful exercise 
of motherhood. Any discriminatory or unfavorable treatment of a 
woman on the basis of special circumstances she might be facing 
at the time of making the decision of whether to be a mother (for 
example, at an early age, within marriage or not, with a partner 
or without one, while working, etc.) is a flagrant violation of the 
constitutional right to the free development of the individual.”
(iv) Health, life and bodily integrity as limits to the legislature’s 
discretion over criminal matters
“The Constitutional Court has mentioned several times that the 
right to health, even if it is not included as one of the rights the 
Constitution considers fundamental, it acquires such essence when 
is connected with the right to life, i.e. when it protection is necessary 
to preserve the life of a person.”
“Prima facie, it is not proportionate or reasonable for the Colombian 
state to obligate a person to sacrifice her or his health in the interest 
of protecting third parties, even when those interests are also 
constitutionally relevant.”
(v) The issue of abortion in comparative law
“Without pretending to describe foreign legislation or the 
jurisprudence in other countries, a highlight can be placed on 
the fact that, even though abortion has been subject to legislative 
changes in most of the western States, constitutional judges have 
also pronounced statements regarding the constitutional dimensions 
of legal norms subject to constitutional control.” 
“… [However] the legislature’s intervention in this subject has 
not been an obstacle for the abortion to be a matter approached by 
constitutional tribunals. Only to exemplify this point, the decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court of Justice in 1973, of the German 
Constitutional Tribunal in 1975 and 1985, and of the Spanish 
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Constitutional Tribunal in 1985, can be mentioned. This does not 
intend to be a description of the constitutional laws in these three 
countries, or their jurisprudential evolution.”
“Even though it has not been the only opportunity on which it has 
dealt with abortion, Roe vs. Wade constitutes without a doubt the 
most well-known case approached by the U.S. Supreme Court on 
this matter. The controversy took place starting from a lawsuit filed 
by a citizen that claimed her right to abort, and therefore alleged 
the unconstitutionality of the norm that criminalized abortion in the 
state of Texas. In this opportunity the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly 
recognized the right of pregnant women to abort, being this a right that 
derives from the right to individual autonomy and intimacy to make 
decisions that are free from the State or third parties intervention in 
the individual private sphere (Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution).”
“Nonetheless, the Court also recognized that the State has a 
legitimate interest on the protection of both, women’s rights and the 
potential life of the unborn. As a result, it stated that none of those 
two interests can be disregarded, but, in every stage of the pregnancy 
of a woman, both will have different importance.”
“… [In] the same order of ideas, two decisions by the German 
Constitutional Tribunal can be highlighted. On the first decision about 
abortion (Verdict 39, 1 of 1975), the German Constitutional Tribunal 
decided that section 218A of the legislation of the Federal German 
Republic, which decriminalized the practice of abortion during the 
first three months of pregnancy without the need for the mother to 
justify herself, was unconstitutional. The constitutional judge argued 
that the German Constitution protects the life of the unborn as an 
independent legal interest, which detaches from the affirmation 
that life and human dignity are supreme and unquestionable values 
contained in Bonn Fundamental Law. Following these axiological 
principles, the woman has a duty to take her pregnancy until the 
birth moment, and the state has the obligation to implement legal 
mechanisms inclined to protect the life of the fetus. Therefore, it is 
possible and even desirable for the legislature to impose criminal 
71
sanctions, or others with the same effectiveness, inclined to avoid a 
reproachable conduct such as abortion.
“However, at the same time as the German Constitutional Tribunal 
emphatically declared the preeminence of the legal interest in the 
protection of the unborn over the protection of the right to free 
development of women, it also admitted that the obligation to take 
pregnancy until the birth moment exists with the exception of those 
cases on which it becomes such an extraordinary and oppressive 
burden that it results reasonably unenforceable. According to the 
Tribunal, this take place particularly when the woman has special 
reasons of medical nature (continuing with pregnancy endangers her 
life or is a serious threat against her health), eugenicist (the fetus will 
suffer of serious malformations), ethical (the pregnancy is the result 
of a crime such as rape) or social (serious economical needs of the 
woman and her family).”
D. SOME COMMENTS ON THE COURT’S RULING C – 355/06 
Two dissenting and two concurring opinions were presented in this 
time at the decision made by the Court. Both dissenting –Rodrigo 
Escobar Gil and Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra– argued the rights 
of the mother cannot have more value than the unborn, even under 
circumstances constituted as an undue burden for her. For the 
justices how delivered this idea, the ratio decidendi of the previous 
decision –C 133/94–, had to be follow and, therefore, abortion must 
be criminalize as the Criminal Code do it, i.e. without giving the 
woman any possibility to get an abortion. 
From the two dissenting opinions, the one from Justice Manuel José 
Cepeda Espinosa contains a good comparative law analysis. As 
Cepeda stated, his only purpose in his concurring opinion, was to 
explain additional reason which led him to share the decision from 
the majority, in his words, “This reason is based on comparative 
constitutional jurisprudential law, which served a critical function in 
defining my position.”
Cepeda made a summary of several countries abortion decisions, 
including –as well as United States, Germany and Ireland– Italy, 
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France, Portugal, Spain, Canada, Hungary and Poland. Thus, 
after showing the “status of the art” of abortion in the Western, 
he concluded: (i)  The legal question of abortion must be solved 
according to the Constitution in force in each country, (ii) None of 
the decisions concluded the legislature has an absolute competence 
regulating the abortion matters, (iii) Prohibition of abortion cannot 
be absolute, (iv) At some stages of pregnancy –not the same for each 
country– life of the unborn justifies criminalization of abortion, (v) 
Life of the unborn can be limited to respect the rights of pregnant 
women, and (vi) Three conditions have been considered solid 
enough to justify abortion.
         
IV. FAILED LAW V. MIGRATION OF IDEAS
For many decades, the changing process in most of the Latin 
American countries has been determined by the idea of an inadequate 
legal system, as a consequence of the wide rift existing between State 
law as enacted and the way people behave43 and the impossibility to 
make laws enforceable.  Therefore, the discourse managed in Latin 
America –based on the legal system inadequateness– to support an 
urgent change, moves around the “Latin America Failed Law” idea, 
which has impregnated the entire society.  
The idea of “Failed Law” –for both legislature and judiciary– can 
only be suppressed by changing the existing laws and looking legal 
systems abroad. Thus, “borrowing ideas” abroad has been usually 
the next step used, in this attempt for suppress the stigmatization 
Latin America gave itself. 
Nevertheless, the idea of “borrowing” always signal that positive is 
being transferred without alteration, which takes attention away from 
the cases in which one country draws negative implications from 
another country’s experience or from the cases in which ideas are 
irremediably altered as they moved44. Therefore, the Latin American 
43 Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 
41, 49 (2003).
44 Lane Scheppel, The Migration of anti-constitutional ideas: The post-9/11 
globalization of Public Law and the International State of Emergency, in The 
Migration of Constitutional Ideas 448, 348 (Sujit Choudry ed. 2006) 
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experience has showed, how each time a process of “borrowing ideas” 
happen in the region, the gap between law and society increase as a 
consequence of the change, which –most of the times– goes in the 
opposite direction it should do it to give solutions. Hence –besides 
the problem of expect laws will succeed as they did in the country 
from they were borrowed–, following Jorge Esquirol45, this “Latin 
America Failed Law” idea bring –at least– three more consequences: 
(i) Undermine legitimacy of State law and it institutions; (ii) Keep 
decisions off the table, and; (iii) Undermines the positions of many 
Latin American States in hemispheric legal relations.
Emphasizing on this, the process of “borrowing ideas” does not take 
into account the conditions in which the borrow idea was created, in 
other words, the issues the legislature tried to regulate passing a law, 
or the judiciary tried to solve pondering specific rights. Borrow do 
not take into account neither the context ideas come or the specific 
problems that need to be solve in the country that is borrowing.  
On the other hand, migration of ideas –which occurs at various 
stages in the life-cycle of modern constitutions46–, in opposition to 
the “borrowing” idea, resist to the initiative of bring without any 
change the laws of foreign countries and, therefore, the context of 
the place where the ideas are migrating must be take into account. In 
other words, borrowing implies both that ideas are positive influence 
and cannot be subject to modification or –even– adaptation; on the 
contrary, under migration, the borrowing prohibitions does not 
apply and the place where ideas are migrating has the discretion to 
receive them conferring more or less value, or making them fit into 
the place, according to its institutional, social, historical and cultural 
45 Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America. 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 75, 77 (2008)
46 Sujit Choudry, Migration as a new Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, 
in The Migration of Constitutional ideas 448, 1 – 36 (Cambridge University Press 
ed., 2006). For him three stages in the migration of ideas can take place: (i) The use 
of foreign law in constitutional interpretation; (ii) The use of foreign constitutions in 
the process of constitution-making; and, (iii) From the national to the supranational 
level. Of these three different stages, Colombia has passed over the second one 
when the 1991 Constitution came into force; migrating ideas basically form the 
Spanish and German constitutions. In addition, show how the first stage has been 
used is the purpose of this paper.
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context47. Migration of ideas – according to the approaches referred 
here –, might be solution to the “Failed Law” idea Latin America 
have been carrying for decades, permitting substantial changes only 
when they are required and not under a functional approach –under– 
which Latin America must enact laws of those countries where they 
really work. Nonetheless, is possible to question if this migration 
approach can make the “Failed Law” idea disappear from many 
scholars mind. 
For Jorge Esquirol –with whom I agree–, the Latin America “Failed 
Law” idea is nothing more than a mere fiction48, not because it does not 
exist but because of the purpose it was conceived, i.e. legal changes. 
Even when is true that there is a rift between law and society49, this 
sole argument is not enough to categorize the law in Latin America as 
“Failed”, especially when this is a problem the majority of Civil Law 
Family have to deal with as a consequence of establish most of the 
rules in codes, which with the pass of time require some changes in 
order to adjust them to the society necessities. Thus, the real problem 
the “Failed Law” idea possess, consist in the subsequent use of the 
“borrowing ideas” approach to solve the problem. 
Considering the “Failed Law” idea in Latin America does not exist, 
is a mere fiction or a utopia; migration of ideas approach is the most 
accurate to answer the “Failed Law” idea and it consequences, .i.e. 
legal changes – by borrowing ideas – which does not work.
Therefore, answer to “what significance, if any, do constitutional 
practices in other nations, or other international influences, have in the 
resolution of constitutional issues concerning abortion in Colombia?” 
is a question that can only be consider regarding the migration of 
47 This second way in which ideas can migrate, resemblance to other of the 
comparative constitutional law approaches, i.e. contextualism. As Tushnet has defined 
it, contextualism “emphasizes the fact that constitutional law is deeply embedded in 
the institutional, doctrinal, social, and cultural contexts of each nation, and that we are 
likely to go wrong if we try to link about any specific doctrine or institution without 
appreciating the way it is tightly linked to all the contexts within which it exist”. See 
Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights, 10 (Princeton University Press ed., )    
48  Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America. 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 75, 78 (2008)
49 See footnote 40
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ideas. On the contrary, the use of other ways of doing comparative 
law, such as the “normative universalism” and “functionalism”, are 
unsuccessful trying to answer to the question, precisely because of 
the effortless answer they can provide. “The way Colombia solves 
constitutional issues concerning abortion to the abortion problem 
differs from the practices around the rest of the world” is the only 
possible answer form this to ways, which reinforce the idea of “Failed 
Law” and can open the possibility to “borrow ideas”. 
In addition, “contextualism” and “expressivism” approaches, even 
when they are useful answering the question by a deep analysis about 
to what extent the constitutional experiences are useful in Colombia 
–i.e. how the social, cultural and religious contexts of the country can 
limit the influences coming from the outside–, they can be more useful 
if are study together with the migration of ideas. As a result, from the 
decision of add to the migration of ideas approach these two –thinking 
on them as a whole–, a precise comparative law study in which, besides 
of analyze which ideas migrated –and how they did it– is possible to 
add the reasons why some ideas tried to migrate but could not do it.  
After all, the question previously referred –following this new 
panorama– goes beyond showing how foreign experiences are useful 
in Colombia solving abortion issues50, tries also to analyze how 
migration of ideas works –including which ideas migrate– in Colombia 
and it utility solving the consequences “Failed Law” idea has brought, 
i.e. (i) Undermine legitimacy of State law and it institutions; (ii) Keep 
decisions off the table, and; (iii) Undermines the positions of many 
Latin American States in hemispheric legal relations.   
A. RULING C- 355/06 AND THE MIGRATION OF IDEAS
After reading the Court decision, one might assume the Court 
large reference to the issue of abortion in comparative law –an 
exclusive chapter for it– must have a concrete reason. Thus, the 
reason to look for can be extracted from Justice Cepeda concurring 
50 As mentioned above, “normative universalism” and “functionalism” are also able 
to answer the question; nevertheless their scope is lesser compare to the migration 
of ideas approach and, is not useful for the main purpose of this paper.
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opinion, “Comparative constitutional jurisprudential law shows 
that when a Constitution, as the Colombian one, contains a Bill of 
Rights, the legislature is forbidden to adopted absolutist positions, 
whether if it is to protect the life of the fetus, or to ensure the freedom 
of women.” Nevertheless, this statement only find it true context 
under migration of ideas approach, basically if is take into account 
“normative universalism” or “functionalism” can arrive to the same 
Justice Cepeda conclusion, but cannot go beyond it, because under 
comparative law abortion is regulated in different way in each country 
and, the Colombian standard is not identical to other country.   
Therefore, once the different abortion decisions of three western 
countries –each one of them giving a different solution to the abortion 
issues– has been analyzed and is known the substantial changes 
Colombian Constitutional Court decision made regarding abortion, is 
possible to establish the ideas that migrated and the significance they 
had in the decision.
In part three (III) of the present paper, study of ruling C – 355/06 
was divided in five main topics, which –excluding the fifth one– 
contains an idea migrating from United States or Germany, which 
was essential for the Court decision. The following scheme can be 
useful to understand the migration.
UNITED STATES GERMANY IRELAND
Life seen as a
constitutionally
relevant value that
must be protected by
the Colombian State
 
The principle and
fundamental dignity
right as a limit on the
legislature’s
discretion over
criminal matters

The right to free
development of the
individual as a limit
to the legislature’s
discretion over
criminal matters

Health, life and
bodily integrity as
limits to the
legislature’s
discretion over
criminal matters
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Even when the graphic above results explicit on it content and analysis, 
few comments –or appreciations– for a better comprehension on 
how constitutional ideas in the abortion case migrated to Colombia 
are necessary, furthermore, when some critics might be expect of 
this migration of ideas classification.
First of all, must be recognized that the idea of “life seen as a 
constitutionally relevant value that must be protected by the Colombian 
State” might be migrating not only from Germany and Ireland but also 
from the United States. From the excerpts and analysis of both United 
States decisions, can be concluded –and even the Supreme Court of 
the United States made it textually– that the State possess an interest 
in the protection of the unborn life as it is in Germany and Ireland. 
Nevertheless, for the Supreme Court of the United States the unborn 
cannot be consider “person” according to the Constitution and, 
therefore, the State has a mere interest in the protection of the unborn 
life when he is viable. On the contrary, Germany and Ireland are more 
emphatic in the equal protection of mother and unborn right to life by 
recognizing that wherever life exists, the state must protect it.
This idea –Germany and Ireland– was followed by Colombia, where 
the Court recognized the unborn must be protected by the State by the 
sole fact that there is life –without stage of pregnancy distinctions–, 
even when he does not possess the protection of the constitutional 
right to life, which can entitled him to enjoy the full protection of 
other constitutional rights, of which right to life is the basis.
Secondly, the idea of “the principle and fundamental dignity right 
as a limit on the legislature’s discretion over criminal matters”, as 
construed by the Colombian Constitutional Court, do not seem to have 
a close connection with the German human dignity idea.. Even so, the 
migration of this idea came years before when the 1991 Constitution 
was enacted, because one of the constitutional experiences Colombia 
looked towards in that moment was Germany. Moreover, since year 
1992 the Constitutional Court began construing this constitutional 
right and principle; in a 1992 decision the Court held that “This 
Constitution shares a new philosophical orientation that places man 
in the privileged position and is the most effective instrument in 
service of the dignifying of the human   person. This is shown by a 
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good part of its text, but specially the preamble and articles 1 to 95, 
which permeate all the national order.51” In that order of ideas, the 
Constitutional Court has been construing the idea human dignity for 
nineteen years and when the abortion provisions were challenged 
in year 2006, the Court already has its own construction of human 
dignity –in the Colombian society–, based on the German idea, been 
this the reason why identify the migration in the human dignity idea 
is only possible looking backwards.
V. CONCLUSIóN
The migration of ideas approach has been useful for Latin America 
–especially after the creation of Constitutional Courts–, to wipe out 
the gap between law and society perception, where law and legal ideas 
borrowed by Europe –mostly– and United States simply because 
remain in the books and do not apply in practise. Additionally, “hard 
cases”, as abortion, are the perfect example to show how borrowing 
ideas still not being the path Latin America follows and, on the 
contrary, migration of ideas allows local judges to pick and choose 
what they consider as relevant by making ideas fit into Constitution 
interpretation and better solve the tension in their society.
After the analysis, the first question that arises is where to place 
Colombia in the comparative law of abortion scenario. The graphic did 
in the analysis of the United States, Germany and Ireland –this time 
including Colombia– can help how abortion is regulated nowadays.
When the Colombian Constitutional Court made it decision on 
abortion in 2006, the main purpose of the judicial elites was to 
mention the “status of the art” in a vast number of Western countries 
51 Colombian Constitutional Court, Decision T – 414/92 
Liberal
(Abortion is
allowed
without
requirements)
UNITED STATES
GERMANY
IRELAND
COLOMBIA
Conservative
(Abortion is
only allowed
under specific
circumstances)
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for two reasons. The first one was to find the ideas that were migrating 
from the US and Europe in order to legitimize their use of foreign 
law and bring about legal change by using strategically the failed law 
fiction.  Secondly they used the notions of human dignity and privacy 
by departing from the function of these ideas in Germany or in the US 
and to address the problems Colombia was facing with abortion at the 
time, i.e. the subsequent practice of illegal abortions, the stigmatization 
women suffered when they practiced an abortion, especially in a 
society with a predominant catholic population. Those problems 
lead me to ask if the graphic –bearing in mind the problems faced by 
other constitutional tribunals were not the same that the Colombian 
Constitutional Court faced– shows the exact scenario and if Colombia 
is well placed. Answering the question, Justice Cepeda thought:
“In comparison with the jurisprudence of other constitutional tribunals 
worldwide, Colombian jurisprudence on abortion, represents an 
intermediate stance. On the one hand, decisions like the one adopted by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, recognizing the right of women 
to choose to carry out an abortion and the qualitative differences 
between state protection of unborn humans vis-à-vis protection of born 
persons, represent the most pro-choice position. Other courts have 
adopted an intermediate stance, such as the German Constitutional 
Tribunal, for which the fetus receives full state protection. This stance 
supports the criminalization of abortion, but also admits that, under 
certain circumstances, the protection of the mother’s rights becomes 
more important than the interest in the fetus’ life.”52
Following Cepeda’s argument one can find what, from the migration 
of ideas perspective, Colombia is well placed between Germany and 
Ireland, because –as have been established before and he remarks–, 
the ideas of human dignity and equal protection to the life of the 
mother and the unborn, are the most influential for the Court’s 
decision, even when the Court accepted the mother possess a right of 
“privacy” based on the right to free development of the individual. 
Additionally, one important difference exists between Germany, 
52 Manuel Jose Cepeda, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The Origin, Role 
and Impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. 
Rev. 529, 558 (2004) 
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Colombia and Ireland. In the first one, abortion is not allowed 
during the first three months if the woman goes to a physician and he 
authorizes; in Colombia, the requirements to practice an abortion are 
related with health issues, even when the mother possess the her to 
free development, which enclose the right of the mother to finish her 
pregnancy status; consequently, even when Ireland allows abortion 
for health issues, mother and unborn possess equal rights.    
Another –final– aspect to take into account is the middle line in the 
graphic dividing the countries on the scenario. By this line I tried to 
create a division in terms of legality of abortion inside the scenario, 
having the United States as the unique country where this practice is 
legal during the first three months of pregnancy.    
A. Migration of ideas challenges
Even when the structure and further practice –as this paper has 
shown– of migration of ideas is important to address some of the 
problems Latin American courts have dealing with “hard cases”, 
judicial behaviour53 and the perception some judges have about 
comparative law54 is probably the main difficult migration of ideas 
in Latin America.
Nonetheless, society is not changeless and law must evolve as fast 
as society. Let judges stop thinking about comparative law from a 
functional approach is, therefore, a first necessary step to banish of 
Latin America the “Failed Law” thesis.
53 See, David Landau, The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional 
Jurisprudence: A new Approach to modeling Judicial Behavior in Latin America, 
37 Geo. Wash. Int’l. L. Rev. 687 (2005)
54 Colombian Constitutional Court in decision C – 342/06 noted that, “although the 
examination of the mentioned foreign influence helps to understand how a benches 
regime works, it must be understood and applied inside the current Constitution 
context. Resort to comparative law is, without a doubt, important in the measure 
in which it facilitates the comprehension of certain legal institutions; furthermore 
when we are in a globalized world, in which reciprocal influences between diverse 
legal systems are more frequent. But not because of this we can forget this is only 
an auxiliary criterion of interpretation and what is important in constitutional 
hermeneutic is depart from the text of the Colombian Political Charter and the 
reality that constitutes the regulation object.”
